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A primary objective of the philosophy of mind is to develop a 
practical understanding of the concept of consciousness. Such 
an understanding should include knowledge about the nature 
and characteristics of consciousness, and what types of rela-
tionships it has to physical bodies and properties. However, 
comprehending consciousness has proven to be an extremely 
challenging and highly elusive task. Many of the problems 
associated with consciousness stem from the inability to recog-
nize its origin(s) and the indistinctness of its relational char-
acteristics. This indeterminacy is clearly demonstrated by the 
inconclusiveness of the explanations that have attempted to give 
a proper account of the basic features of conscious experiences. 
These conscious, or phenomenal, experiences are characterized 
by certain feelings and sensations, which give one having such 
experiences the knowledge and understanding of “what it is like 
to be” in those particular phenomenal states. David Chalmers, a 
prominent phenomenalist, explains: “The phenomenal concept of 
mind…is the concept of mind as conscious experience, and of a 
mental state as a consciously experienced mental state…On the 
phenomenal concept, mind is characterized by the way it feels.”1 
A major difficulty in explaining the phenomenal 
concept of mind is that it is unclear whether conscious states, 
also referred to as the subjective characters of experience, are 
to be described merely as constituents of the physical world, 
or if they have some additional transcendent qualities that defy 
purely physical explanations. The view that seeks to establish the 
former claim, that the conscious states of mind are in fact part of 
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the physical world, is appropriately termed physicalism. Thus, 
according to physicalism, the subjective characters of expe-
rience are to be defined merely as physical states of the brain 
(another way of putting this is that conscious or mental states are 
identical to brain states). The latter view, that there is more to 
conscious states than can be explained in purely physical terms, 
is known as dualism. Since things that transcend the physical 
world are presently indefinable, the primary claim of dualism is 
that conscious states of the mind are not merely physical states 
of the brain. The concept of consciousness can be a very compli-
cated and technical metaphysical issue, and like most philosoph-
ical topics it is highly conceptual and somewhat unsubstantiated; 
hence, matters pertaining to consciousness have fueled the 
debate between physicalism and dualism for quite some time.
The focus of this paper will be to examine a certain 
contention that relates to contemporary deliberations in the 
philosophy of mind. More specifically, it will analyze and assess 
a particular argument that has been advanced by John Perry in 
his recent book, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. 
Perry is advocating antecedent physicalism, which is a form of 
physicalism that is supposed to account for phenomenal states 
of mind in a purely physical context. Much of his claim rests on 
showing that some of the more prominent arguments for dualism 
actually pose no threat to his version of physicalism. One such 
argument that Perry seeks to refute is the zombie argument, 
which David Chalmers introduced in his book The Conscious 
Mind. Perry attempts to show that the zombie argument is 
actually not an argument for dualism, but rather a test for epiphe-
nomenalism, which is a theory concerned with the causal aspects 
of phenomenal states. Perry concludes that epiphenomenalism 
is not a theory that supports dualism, and that the zombie argu-
ment is really a determinant of epiphenomenalism; therefore, the 
zombie argument is not an argument for dualism, and poses no 
threat to antecedent physicalism. 
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Although Perry’s conclusions are based on well-devel-
oped and sophisticated ideas, they are not entirely correct, for 
there is a consideration that Perry seemingly overlooks. It is the 
fact that properties are sources of causality because properties 
just are causal powers. This is a basic and sensible claim that has 
been explicated by Sydney Shoemaker in his paper, “Causality 
and Properties.” Recognizing the causal powers of properties 
is extremely important because it undermines one of the basic 
premises on which Perry’s arguments are founded. The objec-
tive of this paper is to demonstrate that epiphenomenalism is in 
fact an argument for dualism, and this claim will be established 
by showing that properties are causal powers. At this point, the 
relevance of the causal powers of properties is probably not 
evident, but this issue will be clarified shortly, and by the end of 
this paper it should be clear why Perry’s conclusions are erro-
neous. However, before the reasons why Perry’s conclusions turn 
out to be incorrect are revealed, it would be helpful to get some 
background information on the argument that he challenges, as 
well as a general overview of his own argument; this will make 
it easier to understand and trace Perry’s line of reasoning. Thus, 
this paper will first provide a brief review of the zombie argu-
ment, followed by a synopsis of Perry’s premises and conclu-
sions. Then it will explain the causal powers of properties and 
show how these causal powers undermine Perry’s conclusions 
about epiphenomenalism and the zombie argument.
The Zombie Argument 
A well-known argument that endorses the dualist account 
of consciousness is David Chalmers’ zombie argument. In this 
example, Chalmers seeks to invalidate the physicalist’s claim that 
conscious states and experiences are only physical states of the 
brain by maintaining that there exists “the logical possibility of 
a zombie: someone or something physically identical to me (or 
to any other conscious being), but lacking conscious experiences 
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altogether” (Chalmers 94). Likewise, zombies live in “a zombie 
world: a world physically identical to ours, but in which there are no 
conscious experiences at all” (Chalmers 94). Further, a zombie will 
also be functionally identical to his/her actual-world counterpart 
because:
he will be processing internal configurations being 
modified appropriately and with indistinguishable 
behavior resulting…(and) he will be awake, able to 
report the contents of his internal states, able to focus 
attention in various places, and so on. It is just that 
none of this functioning will be accompanied by any 
real conscious experience. There will be no phenom-
enal feel (Chalmers 95)2. 
Thus, the only thing differentiating a zombie from his/
her real-world counterpart is that zombies lack the subjective 
characters of experience that are an essential part of the human 
experience. The possibility of the existence of beings that are 
physically indiscernible from humans, but that are completely 
without conscious experience is supposed to show that the 
phenomenal states of mind are not identical with any physical 
states of the brain. If the phenomenal states of mind were equal 
to certain physical states of the brain, then it would be logically 
impossible for beings that are physically indiscernible from 
humans to be without conscious experiences altogether; it would 
be necessary for zombies to have the subjective characters of 
experience that humans have. However, since it is logically 
possible for beings that are physically identical to humans but 
that lack conscious experiences to exist, it is evident that the 
phenomenal states of mind are not to be identified with the 
physical states of the brain. Therefore, there is a duality between 
phenomenal states and brain states, and the former cannot be 
explained in terms of the latter (i.e., phenomenal states cannot be 
explained by physicalism).
The zombie argument is one of the arguments against 
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physicalism that Perry considers and challenges. By contem-
plating some of the possibilities associated with epiphenome-
nalism, he is able to conclude that the zombie argument does not 
damage physicalism, because under certain circumstances it is 
possible for the physicalist to accept the existence of zombies.
Perry’s Argument
In chapter 4 of Knowledge, Possibility, and Conscious-
ness Perry examines the zombie argument and determines that 
it is irrelevant to the debate between physicalism and dualism: 
“What may be somewhat surprising, though, is that the possi-
bility of a Chalmers zombie world really has virtually nothing at 
all to do with the issue of physicalism versus dualism.”3 Instead, 
he believes “It is a test for epiphenomenalism versus the efficacy 
of the conscious” (Perry 77). This is a substantial claim, and to 
thoroughly assess Perry’s reasoning, the concepts of epiphenom-
enalism and the efficacy of the conscious must be completely 
understood. 
Epiphenomenalism is a theory that is concerned with 
the causal aspects of phenomenal states; its primary interest is 
the cause-and-effect relationship between conscious events and 
events that occur in the physical world. Perry defines epiphe-
nomenalism “simply as the doctrine that conscious events are 
effects but not causes” (Perry 78). Thus, phenomenal states 
of mind are affected and shaped by events taking place in the 
physical world, but they do not influence or impact the outcomes 
of physical events. In effect, they are results that do not produce 
further results. This notion can be compared to the occurrence of 
a shadow that any regular physical object casts when the sun is 
in an appropriate position to produce such a result. The existence 
of an object’s shadow is an effect that is created or generated 
by events in the physical world (the mass of the physical object 
blocking a portion of the sun’s light). However, the shadow 
itself does not create or generate any other effects or events in 
6
the physical world, it simply exists as it is. According to epiphe-
nomenalism, the relationship that the shadow has to the physical 
world is the same type of relationship that phenomenal experi-
ences have to the physical world. That is, they are outcomes but 
not initiators of physical events.
The efficacy of the conscious also describes the cause-
and-effect relationship between conscious events and events that 
take place in the physical world, but the roles that each of the 
events play is slightly different. According to the efficacy of the 
conscious, phenomenal states of mind are both causes and effects 
of physical events. Therefore, phenomenal experiences are not 
only the results of events that occur in the physical world, they 
also initiate and influence the occurrence of other physical events 
(i.e., phenomenal states of mind directly affect, and are directly 
affected by the physical world). For the purposes of this paper, 
the position that promotes the efficacy of the conscious will be 
coined “efficacism,” and the proponents of efficacism will be 
referred to as “efficacists.” 
It is important to understand the difference between 
epiphenomenalism and efficacism because it is precisely on this 
distinction that Perry builds his case against the zombie argu-
ment. He acknowledges that the concept of epiphenomenalism is 
generally associated with dualism, but determines that it is also 
compatible with physicalism: 
Epiphenomenalism is usually considered to be a form 
of dualism. But we defined it simply as the doctrine 
that conscious events are effects but not causes. So 
defined, it appears to be consistent with physicalism 
(Perry 78).
If epiphenomenalism is in fact compatible with physicalism, 
then it seems that epiphenomenalism cannot be an argument that 
supports dualism. Hence, according to Perry, it is conceivable for 
a physicalist to be an epiphenomenalist as well. 
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At this point it should be noted that in his argument 
Perry distinguishes between what he believes to be the two 
different types of possible zombie worlds that may exist. The 
first, which he refers to as a “Chalmers zombie world,” is 
exactly the example that David Chalmers himself formulates; it 
was briefly reviewed in the earlier portion of this paper. Perry 
concludes that a Chalmers zombie world is impossible for a 
physicalist to accept because it would not be physically identical 
to the actual world. Physicalism promotes the view that phenom-
enal states are physical states, and that they produce certain 
effects in the physical world. Thus, the complete absence of 
consciousness in the Chalmers zombie world would necessarily 
constitute a difference in the physical structure of the zombies, 
which in turn would negate the causal powers that conscious 
states are supposed to possess. 
However, Perry does believe that it is plausible for a 
physicalist to accept the existence of a second type of zombie 
world, which he calls an “almost Chalmers zombie world.” 
In this zombie world, the physical difference resulting strictly 
from the complete absence of consciousness is recognized and 
accepted. Therefore, the only potential physical discrepancy is 
the one that results from the effects that phenomenal states of 
mind have on the outcome of physical events. Perry attempts to 
resolve this disparity by appealing to epiphenomenalism, which 
he already assumes is consistent with physicalism. He reasons 
that if the only physical dissimilarity to be accounted for is the 
one that results from the causality of conscious states, then it 
is possible for a physicalist to accept the existence of zombies, 
provided he/she is also an epiphenomenalist (remember that 
epiphenomenalism considers conscious states of mind to only 
be effects, and not causes, of physical events). Consequently, 
if a physicalist epiphenomenalist can accept the possibility of 
zombies, two critical facts seem to emerge: 
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(1)  Epiphenomenalism is in fact compatible with 
physicalism; therefore, it is not an argument for 
dualism.
(2)  The possible existence of zombies is also compat-
ible with physicalism; thus, the zombie argument 
is an argument that neither establishes dualism 
nor invalidates physicalism. 
Table 1 represents the various outcomes of Perry’s 
entire argument. It accounts for the two major debates that Perry 
considers to be the focal points of his claims: A) physicalism vs. 
dualism; and B) epiphenomenalism vs. efficacism. These views 
in varying combinations make up the four philosophical posi-
tions that are pertinent to the zombie issue: 
 • Physicalist epiphenomenalist
 • Physicalist efficacist
 • Dualist epiphenomenalist
 • Dualist efficacist
The table illustrates which philosophical positions can 
accept the potential existence of the two types of zombie worlds 
that Perry has described. It provides a “yes” or “no” answer to 
the question: “Can this particular philosophical position (phys-
icalist epiphenomenalist, physicalist efficacist, dualist epiphe-
nomenalist, dualist efficacist) accept the possible existence 
of this type of zombie world?” (Note: “CZW” designates the 




Physicalist CZW         ACZW CZW        ACZW
 No              Yes  No              No
Dualist CZW         ACZW CZW        ACZW
 Yes             Yes  No              No
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After examining the table, one is able to realize a few 
important facts. First, that the possible existence of any type of 
zombie world lacking total consciousness is completely incom-
patible with both forms of efficacism. This should come as no 
surprise, though, because according to efficacism, phenomenal 
states have causal powers that affect the outcome of events 
in the physical world. So if there are certain worlds in which 
beings lack consciousness altogether, there will necessarily be 
a difference in the outcome of physical events in those worlds. 
Second, all types of zombies are completely compatible with 
both types of dualism; this should be equally obvious because 
the zombie argument is one that supports a dualist conclusion in 
the first place. Finally, it should also be apparent why a phys-
icalist epiphenomenalist cannot accept the “Chalmers zombie 
world” (CZW). This is because the absence of consciousness in 
each zombie is supposed to account for the physical difference 
between the CZW and the actual-world (remember that physi-
calism assumes that phenomenal states are identical to physical 
states of the brain). Basically, this claim is stipulated by Perry 
because it is dependent on the distinction between the CZW and 
the ACZW (“almost Chalmers zombie world”) that he builds 
into his argument. Interestingly enough, this distinction is not as 
significant as it may seem. In fact, it may be quite irrelevant to 
the primary objective of this paper. As long as Perry concludes 
that a physicalist epiphenomenalist can accept the existence of 
some type of zombie (which he does), his claims will turn out to 
be erroneous. It is precisely on this assertion, that it is possible 
for a physicalist epiphenomenalist to accept the possibility of 
zombies, that Perry bases his two (too?) bold conclusions: A) that 
the zombie argument is not an argument for dualism, but rather a 
test for epiphenomenalism; and B) that epiphenomenalism is not 
an argument for dualism because it is compatible with physi-
calism. 
Examining Perry’s entire argument has facilitated a 
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complete understanding of his line of reasoning and has ensured 
that none of his concepts have been overlooked or misinter-
preted. It also has revealed that the differentiation between the 
CZW and the ACZW is not as important as it seems. Thus, for 
argument’s sake, matters can be simplified by completely disre-
garding this distinction and simply focusing on the claim, the 
physicalist epiphenomenalist is able to accept the possibility of 
zombie worlds. This narrower focus is illustrated by the revised 
and straightforward Table 2. (Note: all factors pertaining to the 
information in this table are equivalent to those found in Table 




Physicalist             Yes            No
               
Dualist            Yes            No
       
This table is a much simpler version of Table 1, and so 
its conclusions remain constant. As was previously stated, it 
should be completely obvious and unequivocal why both forms 
of efficacism are incompatible with the possibility of zombie 
worlds, and it should be equally obvious why the dualist epiphe-
nomenalist can accept the possible existence of zombie worlds. 
The only position that is not completely evident is that of the 
physicalist epiphenomenalist.
Although Perry tries to substantiate the ability of this 
position to accept the possible existence of zombie worlds, he 
does not succeed. In a moment, it will be clear why this is so; but 
first, a quick recap of Perry’s main points.
By saying that the zombie argument is a test that deter-
mines epiphenomenalism versus efficacism, rather than an 
argument that supports dualism, Perry claims that the logical 
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possibility of the existence of zombies has nothing to do with 
the issues pertaining to physicalism and dualism. Since the 
possible existence of zombies and zombie worlds is supposedly 
an epiphenomenal matter (i.e., one that is determined by what 
types of causal roles conscious states of mind play), it is logi-
cally possible for both physicalists and dualists to believe in the 
existence of zombies. Since according to epiphenomenalism, 
conscious experiences have absolutely no causal powers, even 
a physicalist can accept the possibility of zombies, provided he/
she is also an epiphenomenalist. Perry’s conclusion is that “The 
zombie argument does not provide an argument for dualism. As 
long as one is an epiphenomenalist, one can accept the possi-
bility of zombies” (Perry 78).
These conclusions would be a substantial victory for the 
physicalist, and would be considerably damaging to the dualist 
position. However, though Perry has well-developed ideas and 
coherent arguments, his conclusions are not entirely correct. As was 
mentioned earlier, the objective of this paper is to demonstrate that 
epiphenomenalism is in fact an argument for dualism, and this will 
be accomplished by revealing that it is impossible for a physicalist 
also to be an epiphenomenalist. This claim will be established by 
invoking the causal powers of properties. 
The Causal Powers of Properties
To realize how the causal powers of properties factor 
into the philosophical issues at hand, it is necessary to have a 
thorough explanation of the characteristics of properties, the 
nature of the causal relationship, and the correlation between the 
two. This will involve recognizing the attributes that properties 
have and understanding what types of roles these attributes play 
in the causal sequence. Once the functional aspects of properties 
are identified, it should become apparent that causality results 
from features of the physical world. Properties turn out to be the 
basic components of change, the factors on which actions and 
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the occurrence of events depend. Therefore, to fully comprehend 
change and causality, an insight into the complexion of proper-
ties is required. 
According to Webster’s Dictionary, ‘property’ is defined 
as “an essential or distinctive attribute or quality of a thing.”4 
Although this is not specifically a philosophical definition, it 
captures the essence of what a property is, and what it consists 
of. A property is a quality of a “thing,” which is an extremely 
broad term that seemingly encompasses all aspects of reality—
namely, mental and physical phenomena. While the mental 
portion of the account may be debatable, it certainly appears 
as though the physical part is not. After all, it is quite probable 
that the subjects most referred to by the descriptive expression 
“things” are in fact physical objects or entities. This is not a 
deeply philosophical matter at all; rather, it is more of a real-
life common-sense observation. Thus, it can be stated with little 
controversy that all physical “things” have properties of some 
sort. For clarification, a physical “thing” is any constituent or 
component of the physical world. More precisely, if it can be 
identified in physical terms, it is a physical “thing,” and all 
physical “things” have properties (at this point, quotation marks 
will no longer be used to draw attention to the indeterminateness 
of the word “thing”; by now the desired effect should have been 
achieved).
The other aspect of a property is that it is an “essential 
or distinctive attribute” of a thing, meaning that a property is a 
fundamental and necessary feature of a thing that serves as the 
defining characteristic of that thing. The properties of a thing 
are what distinguish that specific thing from all of the other 
things found in the physical world; a property is what makes a 
particular thing that particular thing. Since a thing’s properties 
define its existence and set it apart from the rest of the world, it 
once again seems that all physical things must have properties 
of some sort.
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According to physicalism, conscious states of mind are 
identical to the states of the brain, which means that conscious 
events are constituents or components of the brain. If conscious 
events are constituents or components of the brain, then they 
are obviously part of the physical world and can be explained 
in purely physical terms. Thus, the physicalist should have no 
problems acknowledging that conscious events have properties, 
for physical things that can be explained in physical terms have 
properties. 
Once the characteristics of properties have been properly 
examined and assessed, and it has been established that phenom-
enal states of mind have properties, the next step is to explore 
the nature of the causal relationship. The causal relationship is a 
type of connection between certain factors that elicits a change 
in the circumstances surrounding or pertaining to those factors. 
Events have traditionally been thought of as the factors of the 
causal relationship, but events themselves are comprised of 
further parts, namely objects. Objects necessarily have proper-
ties, and the changes in their properties is what actually initiates 
the causal relationship:
It is events, rather then objects or properties, that are 
usually taken by philosophers to be the terms of the 
causal relationship. But an event typically consists of 
a change in the properties or relationships of one or 
more objects, the latter being…called the “constituent 
objects” of the event.5
Although events may in fact cause other events, each 
of the events themselves consists of other parts that determine 
the type of changes that these events undergo. These other parts 
are the constituent objects of the events, and it is the properties 
of the constituent objects of events that actually initiate change. 
“When one event causes another, this will be in part because 
of the properties possessed by their constituent objects” (Shoe-
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maker 109). Hence, the properties of constituent objects are the 
real source of the causal relationship.
To understand how the properties of constituent objects 
actually bring about change, it is necessary to identify the 
characteristics of the properties involved. The causes and effects 
of events can be explained “by mentioning certain properties 
of their constituent objects” (Shoemaker 109). For example, 
consider an event in which the branch of a tree is blown against 
a glass window and breaks it (Shoemaker 109). The event itself 
is the breaking of the glass window, and the constituent objects 
of this event are the tree branch and the glass window. So it 
is a certain property (or properties) of each of the constituent 
objects (the tree branch and the glass window) that initiates the 
resulting change (the breaking of the glass window). By iden-
tifying which property (or properties) of the constituent objects 
made it possible for the event to occur, one is able to determine 
the source of the causal relationship. In this case, “the causal 
relationship holds because of…the massiveness of the one and 
the fragility of the other” (Shoemaker 109). “Massiveness” and 
“fragility” are properties of the tree branch and the glass window, 
respectively, and the fact that these constituent objects possessed 
these properties is what enabled the aforementioned event to 
occur. Therefore, the causal relationship can be understood in 
terms of the characteristics of the properties involved in the 
instance of change.
However, this causal relationship may become difficult 
to recognize because objects can conceivably have an infinite 
amount of properties, some (or most) of which are completely 
irrelevant to the particular instance of change being examined: 
“every object will have innumerable properties that are unlikely 
to be mentioned in any causal explanation involving an event 
of which the object is a constituent” (Shoemaker 110). Thus, 
it is necessary to identify which types of properties are to be 
associated with the causal relationship of a certain event. When 
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considering change and causality, the only properties that should 
be appealed to are “real” or “genuine” properties (Shoemaker 
109); these are “the sorts of properties with respect to which 
change is possible” (Shoemaker 112). Real or genuine prop-
erties are ones that are capable of being changed or producing 
change. This can once again be illustrated by using the previous 
example involving the tree branch and the glass window. The 
“fragility” property of the glass window gave it the capability 
to be changed; this was evidenced by the event of it breaking. 
In addition, this property of the glass window, along with the 
“massiveness” property of the tree branch, enabled a physical 
change to be produced. Thus, the “fragility” of the glass and the 
“massiveness” of the tree branch are real or genuine properties, 
and it is these types of properties that instantiate causal powers.
Now that the nature of the causal relationship has been 
analyzed, the final step is to see how the connection between 
the characteristics of the properties of constituent events and the 
framework of the causal relationship produce causal powers. 
First, it is important to recognize exactly what a causal power is. 
A power is something that is contained in a substance or subject 
(or, as will be shown, in a property) that has the ability “to 
produce effects in material objects…(for example, the power in 
the sun to melt wax)” (Shoemaker 112); powers that can produce 
these types of effects are referred to as “tertiary qualities” 
(Shoemaker 112). Tertiary qualities are the factors that generate 
changes in the physical world, and if some particular thing is to 
have power, it must posses some type of tertiary quality. Further-
more, if a tertiary quality is indeed a source of power, it must be 
able to generate some type of change in the physical world. This 
correlation basically describes the cause-and-effect relationship, 
and can be stated as follows: If something is to have the type of 
power that produces a change in the physical world, then it must 
posses a specific quality, such that the presence of this quality 
will in fact produce certain outcomes in the physical world. 
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“For something to have power, in this sense, is for it to be such 
that its presence in circumstances of a particular sort will have 
certain effects. One can think of such a power as a function from 
circumstances to effects” (Shoemaker 113). 
This function of circumstances to events can be demon-
strated by imagining something that is poisonous (perhaps a pill). 
This poisonous thing has a particular power (for it is something 
that possesses the quality or characteristic of “poisonousness”) 
that will produce certain effects in certain circumstances. “Thus 
if something is poisonous its presence in someone’s body will 
produce death or illness; in virtue of this, being poisonous is a 
power” (Shoemaker 113). At this point, an extremely important 
correlation becomes evident: that the quality of being poisonous 
is also a property! So the quality or characteristic of “poisonous-
ness” actually has two aspects to it: A) it is a property; and B) it 
has some type of causal power. Thus, it has been clearly estab-
lished that properties can be causal powers, at least in certain 
situations. The immediate conclusion is that properties have at 
least some causal potentiality, but that whether or not this poten-
tiality can take effect is dependent on certain factors that decide 
whether or not the property can exercise its causal power(s). The 
ability to conclude this is a significant accomplishment, and now 
the only thing remaining is to show that properties just are causal 
power, at all times.
It has already been determined that whether or not a 
property has causality is dependent on certain factors pertaining 
to the situation that the property is in. So if a property is to 
produce an effect, then it must be in a particular situation such 
that the circumstances of that situation enable the property to 
employ its causal powers. This correlation is parallel to the 
connection between causal powers and the effects that they 
are able to produce, which was described earlier as a function 
from circumstances to events (from causes to effects). Thus, the 
connection between properties and powers is also a function:
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Just as powers can be thought of as functions from 
circumstances to causal effects, so the properties on 
which powers depend can be thought of as functions 
from properties to powers (or, better, as functions 
from sets of properties to sets of powers). One might 
even say that properties are second order powers; 
they are powers to produce first order powers (powers 
to produce certain sorts of events) if combined with 
certain other properties (Shoemaker 114). 
Since properties are a determinant or function of causal 
powers, they are always potential powers, because they have the 
ability to affect the outcome of physical events, provided that 
the surrounding circumstances are appropriate for their poten-
tiality to be realized. Therefore, properties can be referred to as 
conditional powers because their causality is determined by the 
conditions that they are in. Furthermore, “properties are clusters 
of conditional powers” (Shoemaker 115), meaning that they have 
a number of potential or conditional powers that may or may not 
be exercised, depending on the circumstances of the situation. 
These conditional aspects of properties are like dormant powers; 
however, if the right conditions are available, these powers can 
become explicitly active. The right conditions would constitute 
a property interacting with another property (or properties) in 
such a way as to “awaken” its dormant powers. In the poisonous 
pill example, the pill always had the power of being poisonous, 
yet it could not exercise this power until it was put in the correct 
situation (inside of a human body) where it could interact with 
other properties (whatever properties the physical body had that 
enabled the poisonous power of the pill to take effect). Since all 
properties are clusters of conditional powers, there are numerous 
(even infinite) possible combinations of instances where a 
particular property could realize or exercise its potential causal 
powers: “for a property to have a causal potentiality is for it to 
be such that whatever has it has a certain conditional power” 
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(Shoemaker 115). 
Thus, it becomes apparent that properties have potential 
or conditional powers at all times. It is not necessary for these 
powers to be explicitly active, nor is it necessary for them ever 
to be active; the fact is that they are there. Therefore, it has been 
established that properties are always causal powers. Whether 
or not they are active or potential is not the issue, because these 
powers could become active at any given time, given the right 
type of property interaction. Furthermore, saying that properties 
are always causal powers is the same as saying properties just 
are causal powers.
As was stated earlier, this is exactly the claim—that 
properties just are causal powers—that was needed to show 
that Perry’s refutation of the zombie argument via an appeal 
to epiphenomenalism is erroneous. However, before Perry’s 
argument is invalidated, it would be helpful to quickly review the 
main points of the “causality of properties argument”:
•  It was determined that all physical things have 
properties; thus, if one believes that conscious states 
of mind are equal to the physical states of the brain 
(as does the physicalist), then it becomes apparent 
that conscious states of mind have properties.
•  Events are comprised of constituent objects, and 
constituent objects have properties. The character-
istics of these properties cause changes and events; 
hence, properties are the primary factors of the 
causal relationship.
•  Properties always have potential power because 
they are clusters of conditional powers; these 
powers can become active when the clusters of 
powers of different properties combine in a way 
that “activates” the causal powers of one or more 




Perry’s two main conclusions are: A) that the zombie 
argument is irrelevant to the issue of physicalism versus dualism 
because it is actually a test for epiphenomenalism; and B) that 
epiphenomenalism is not an argument for dualism. Both of 
these claims are based on Perry’s assumption that the physicalist 
epiphenomenalist can accept the logical possibility of a zombie 
world.
By saying that the zombie argument is a test that deter-
mines epiphenomenalism versus efficacism, rather than an 
argument that supports dualism, Perry claims that the logical 
possibility of the existence of zombies has nothing to do with the 
issues pertaining to physicalism and dualism. Since the possible 
existence of zombie worlds is supposedly an epiphenomenal 
matter (i.e., one that is determined by what types of causal roles 
conscious states of mind play), it is logically possible for both 
physicalists and dualists to believe in the existence of zombies. 
Since according to epiphenomenalism, conscious experiences 
have absolutely no causal powers, even a physicalist can accept 
the possibility of zombies, provided he/she is also an epiphenom-
enalist. 
However, this paper has demonstrated that: A) all 
components of the physical world have properties; and B) all 
properties are causal powers. Thus, if the physicalist believes 
that conscious states of mind are the same as the physical states 
of the brain (which he/she does), then he/she must also acknowl-
edge that these conscious states have causal powers, because 
it is evident that all properties of physical things have causal 
powers. But, if the physicalist admits this fact, then it becomes 
impossible for him/her also to be an epiphenomenalist, because 
epiphenomenalism states that conscious events are effects but not 
causes. Furthermore, if it is impossible for one to be a physicalist 
and an epiphenomenalist, then it is apparent that epiphenome-
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nalism is not in fact compatible with physicalism; therefore, the 
zombie argument is an argument that supports dualism.
It seems as if the only way Perry can avoid this conclu-
sion is to boldly deny the claim that properties are causal powers, 
but the causality of properties is completely consistent with 
physicalism. In some cases, it may even be construed in such a 
way as to support physicalism (but this is an entirely different 
matter). Anyhow, the findings of this paper make it difficult for 
Perry to reject the causality of properties. If he cannot, then it 
shows that conscious states of mind have causal powers, and 
since physicalism takes phenomenal states of mind simply to 
be physical states of the brain, it seems as if Perry has to accept 
that one cannot be a physicalist and an epiphenomenalist. This 
non-possibility establishes that epiphenomenalism is not consis-
tent with physicalism, as Perry claims; hence, epiphenomenalism 
is a theory that supports dualism.
Thus, this paper has accomplished its initial objective, 
which was to show that epiphenomenalism is in fact an argu-
ment that supports dualism by revealing that it is impossible for 
a physicalist also to be an epiphenomenalist; this was accom-
plished by demonstrating that properties just are causal powers. 
It should be noted that this paper is not an argument attempting 
to establish or support the merits of either dualism or epiphe-
nomenalism; its sole purpose was to show that if the physicalist 
wants to strengthen his/her position by discrediting the zombie 
argument, he/she should not appeal to epiphenomenalism to 
support these claims
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